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The aim of this study is to explain how corporate governance affects environmental 
reporting through the mediating effect of strategic position. The data were collected 
from chief executive managers and chief financial managers of 197 large companies in 
Malaysia. The partial least squares technique was used to test the proposed 
relationships. The results show that managers' strategic posture mediates the impact of 
four aspects of corporate governance, namely, board size, board independency, CSR 
committee presence, and institutional ownership on environmental reporting. These 
findings extend the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and 
environmental reporting by providing insight into the reasons for these relationships. 
The results of the study will be useful for managers of companies and investors to 
become knowledgeable about those aspects of corporate governance which lead to 
higher environmental reporting. This study can also inform policy-makers about the 
types of firms that are less likely to disclose environmental reports and to develop 
effective enforcement of regulations.  
Keywords: Strategic Posture, Corporate Governance, Environmental Reporting 
 
1. Introduction 
Increased public awareness about the role of companies in exacerbating environmental 
problems has led customers to put pressure on companies to take responsibility for 
causing environmental issues. In response to these pressures, as evidence of willingness 
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to accept accountability and responsibility towards the environment, companies publish 
corporate environmental reports to show that they are relatively good environmental 
performers. However, as environmental reporting is voluntary in many countries, it has 
sparked attention from both academics and practitioners to see whether companies are 
indeed acting in good faith to deserve their improved corporate public image. 
Malaysia and other ASEAN countries agreed to address climate change and 
consequently ASEAN members mandate that all publicly listed companies must 
integrate environmental practices into their strategies (Amran et al., 2016). For 
example, in Malaysia, the government implements (i) the National Policy on the 
Environment, (ii) the National Forest policy, (iii) the National Energy Policy, (iv) the 
National Policy on Climate Change Issues, and (v) the Biodiversity Policy to address 
climate change issues. Furthermore, from 2007, Bursa Malaysia mandated that all 
Malaysian publicly listed companies must report their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices relating to the marketplace, the environment, the workplace, and the 
community in their annual reports (Bursa, 2014). Although Malaysian companies have 
dramatically increased their environmental reporting in response to institutional 
pressures, the quality of environmental information disclosed by Malaysian companies 
and the level of environmental reporting is still at an early stage in comparison with 
international best practice (Othman et al., 2009; Buniamin, 2012). As such, it is 
necessary to develop an understanding of factors other than institutional ones that may 
extend the level of environmental reporting of companies in Malaysia as a developing 
country. 
As the environmental reporting level varies considerably among companies 
(Hahn & Kühnen, 2013) and the decision on environmental reporting level depends on 
how the organization is governed, the study on the impact of corporate governance on 
environment reporting is important. Although, there are many studies on the potential 
impact of corporate governance on the level of financial reporting (e.g., Firth et al., 
2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), only recently this type of research has expanded to 
include non-financial reporting (e.g., Jo et al., 2012; Majumder et al., 2017). These 
studies showed the importance of corporate governance structures in enhancing the 
level of corporate social reporting (Jo et al., 2012). However, research on the 
relationship between corporate governance and non-financial reporting has mainly 
focused on corporate social reporting and studies on environmental reporting are 
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lacking. As such, testing the impact of corporate governance on environmental 
reporting is the first objective of this study. More specifically, a contribution of this 
study to the existing literature is to investigate how governance structure relates to 
environmental reporting in annual reports.  
The previous studies found a board governance structure as one of the critical 
determinant of firms' non-financial reporting level (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Jo et 
al., 2012). However, the studies cannot explain how a board governance structure of 
firms affects non-financial reporting. Based on the previous literature on this subject 
(e.g., Álvarez-Gil et al., 2007), the current research assumes organizational decisions 
are based on managers' strategic posture. Thus, in this study, the mediating effect of 
managers' strategic posture was tested to explain the reason that board governance 
structure affects environmental reporting. The findings of this study extend the 
literature on the relationship between strategic posture and non-financial reporting.   
The other parts of this paper are structured as follows. First, the theoretical 
background of the study was reviewed. Second, the conceptual framework was 
developed, and hypotheses were formulated. Later, the research method of this study 
was explained, and the analysis was reported. Lastly, the findings were discussed, and 
implications, limitations, and future potential studies were suggested.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Environmental Reporting 
Environmental reporting, defined as “reports that relate to the impact a company’s 
activities have on the physical or natural environment in which they operate” 
(Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000, p. 16). There is an increasing trend among firms throughout 
the world to voluntarily disclose information of their environmental activities (Gibson 
& O’Donovan, 2007), and there is also evidence that the quality of such environmental 
reporting is improving gradually (Ballou et al., 2006). The increase in the quantity and 
quality might be a result of the company’s growing awareness of the importance of 
environmental reporting, stakeholder demand, or the introduction of mandatory 
reporting (Aminard et al., 2012). Daub (2007) and Branco and Rodrigues (2008) stated 
that most companies disclose environmental reporting due to concerns from 
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stakeholders and society.  
Despite the growing trend in environmental reporting, Nurunnabi (2015) 
reviewed 71 annual reports and found low levels of voluntary environmental reporting. 
In Malaysia, environmental reporting is considered as still in its infancy (Buniamin, 
2012). Since Malaysia is among the rapidly developing Asian countries, it is likely in 
the coming years to face increasing tension between incentives for rapid economic 
development, on the one hand, and ethical considerations concerning the environment, 
on the other. Currently, the requirements of reporting within companies are broader 
than financial reporting. Considering the recent dramatic increase in negative impacts 
on climate change and the proven role of environmental reporting on improving the 
environmental practice of firms, a study on the determinants of environmental reporting 
is highly relevant. There are few existing studies on the underlying factors which 
motivate firms to engage in environmental reporting, especially in developing countries 
(Saleh et al., 2010).  
The investigation of social and environmental reporting in emerging economies 
has revealed that the main motivation behind environmental reporting in emerging 
economies is driven by both external and internal forces, such as stakeholders’ pressure, 
institutional pressure, and corporate governance (Laksmana, 2008; Elijido-Ten et al., 
2010; Ionel-Alin, 2012). Environmental reporting is considered a significant part of a 
company’s responsibility to its stakeholders. The relationship between community 
concern and environmental reporting has been verified: environmental reporting is 
associated positively with societal concerns and awareness of environmental concerns 
(Deegan et al., 2002). Moreover, society and stakeholders’ awareness of these 
environmental issues influences a company’s behaviour and strategies to implement 
environmental practices such as reporting (Gadenne et al., 2009). 
The institutional theory is built on the notion that institutionalized rules and 
norms of society are imposed on the internal structure of organizations (Beggs, 1995, 
p. 613). The definition of institutionalization in organizations is the “process through 
which constituents of formal structure become extensively accepted, as both 
appropriate and necessary, and serve to legitimate organizations” (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983, p. 25). In the context of environmental reporting, there is evidence that 
institutional pressure has an effective role to make companies gain legitimacy (Milne 
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& Patten, 2002). In addition, it is claimed that to gain legitimacy, environmental 
reporting is seen to be a significant tool for environmental management, and that for 
organizations, seeking to gain legitimacy can explain the increase in the level of 
environmental reporting (O’Donovan, 2002). In the literature, three kinds of 
institutional mechanism – namely coercive pressure, normative pressure, and mimetic 
pressure – have been introduced as drivers of environmental reporting (Darnall & 
Edwards, 2006; Khalifa & Davison, 2006; Amran & Haniffa, 2011). Etzion and Ferraro 
(2010) conducted an empirical study to investigate the role of institutional isomorphism 
through two mechanisms of normative and cognitive factors to institutionalize the 
practice of social and environmental disclosure. The study found that 
institutionalization provides pressure for organizations to conform and promotes 
practices that lead to legitimacy, such as environmental reporting. Othman et al. (2009) 
undertook a study to investigate the determinants of CSR reporting in Malaysian public-
listed companies. They found that the factors having the most impact on the level of 
CSR reporting are institutional factors, which are presented as regulatory efforts by 
institutional owners, while family-owned organizations are not considered to 
demonstrate transparency in CSR reporting. Amran and Haniffa (2011) also 
investigated the factors determining the social and environmental reporting in the 
Malaysian context.  Their findings indicated that three institutional mechanisms, 
namely coercive, normative, and mimetic, are critical factors influencing social and 
environmental reporting. 
Corporate governance is defined as “the system by which companies are 
directed and managed” (Abor, 2007), is the principal means by which managers can be 
effectively controlled to prevent the self-interested behavior. The mechanisms it 
employs can be used to solve agency problems (Eng & Mak, 2003; Shan, 2009) as well 
as to mitigate a lack of commitment on the part of management due to agency problems 
(Bergolf & Pajuste, 2005). Hence, corporate governance has been recognized as one of 
the most important features of modern corporations today.  
Where an effective corporate governance system is in place, positive effects 
across the financial, as well as non-financial, aspects of a corporation can be expected. 
Corporate governance is not only recognized as a potential solution to agency problems 
but also, as protection of stakeholder interests (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Wise & 
Ali, 2008). Companies with effective corporate governance system are more likely to 
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promote fairness, transparency, and accountability, that is, ethical transactions, in their 
business (Jamali et al., 2008). This, in turn, gives rise to a disclosure-based environment 
wherein shareholder and stakeholder interests are protected (Hamilton, 2004). When 
corporate governance is ineffective, however, such as where mandatory requirements 
are absent, companies were found to omit material information relevant to stakeholders 
(Mathews, 2008). Such a problem could be rectified by an effective board of directors 
which would implement good corporate governance (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). In 
fact, studies have shown that firms which have effective governance structures have the 
intention to disclose more documents to the market (Beekes & Brown, 2006). In short, 
corporate governance encourages transparency and accountability and enhances the 
disclosure behavior of a company. Hence, the present study focuses on the potential 
influence of corporate governance on the disclosure behavior of organizations, with 
particular reference to environmental disclosure. 
The debate in the existing literature substantiates that there is a relationship 
between the size of the board and the capability of the company, which means that the 
number of directors on the board has an effect on the company’s capability (Wincent 
et al., 2013). According to Welford (2007), a large number of independent directors or 
non-executive directors on the board relates to good corporate governance.  
Independent directors have the capacity to enhance management attention to take into 
consideration environmental responsibilities (Sun et al., 2010). Further, many studies 
have demonstrated that the presence of independent non-executive directors on the 
board has a vital impact on corporate voluntary reporting, such as environmental 
reporting (Barako et al., 2006; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008).  Furthermore, the presence 
of a CSR committee, which reflects the responsibility of the board towards 
environmental and social issues, can make companies consider stakeholders issues.  
The CSR committee typically takes into account environmental issues such as 
establishing policies and standards, monitoring performance and reporting on 
environmental issues (Mackenzie, 2007). 
Many studies have also referred to the dispersion and type of ownership as vital 
factors influencing environmental reporting (Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992).  Brammer 
and Pavelin (2006) stated that ownership dispersion, which means that company stock 
is dispersed among many investors, is likely to lead to an increased risk of agency 
conflict, with the expectation of increased environmental reporting. Moreover, Cormier 
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et al. (2005) claimed that a closely-held ownership or concentration of ownership is not 
likely to be responsive to public reporting, since the main shareholders typically have 
a tendency to be able to access the information they require.  In addition, Reverte (2009) 
remarked that diffused ownership is expected to enhance a company’s financial 
reporting policy through the establishment of social and environmental reporting, 
whereas companies with a concentrated ownership are most likely to disclose additional 
information related to social and environmental issues. The type of ownership is also 
expected to have a vital impact on environmental reporting. Different types of 
shareholders are more likely to require different information: for instance, institutional 
investors such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds have a strong 
motivation to monitor corporate reporting practices and affect corporate values due to 
their large portion of ownership stake (Barako et al., 2006).  Moreover, institutional 
investors are powerful in that they have the ability to monitor their managers effectively 
through their technical expertise (Khan et al., 2005). Based on the literature, corporate 
governance can be manifested and classified into the following: board size, board 
independence, CSR committee presence, ownership concentration, and institutional 
ownership. 
 
2.2 Strategic Posture and Environmental Reporting 
Managers’ strategic posture refers to top managers’ attitudes towards environmental 
reporting. Ullmann (1985) categorized strategic posture to active and passive postures. 
Where there is an active strategic posture, the manager and senior manager team have 
a progressive attitude, actively searching to satisfy stakeholders’ claims, and 
consequently pursue both a competitive advantage and business opportunism. In other 
words, the managers’ attitudes demonstrate a proactive pattern of behavior. In another 
hand, when the manager team adopts a passive strategic posture, a conservative attitude 
gives rise to greater risk aversion, a tendency to maintain the status quo, and a general 
reactive pattern of behavior (Karake, 1995; Crant, 2000). Thus, it is expected that those 
companies with an active strategic posture are more likely to disclose more social and 
environmental information (Ullmann, 1985).  
Conversely, firms with a passive posture are likely only to disclose information 
about environmental outcomes of the firm's activity where there is pressure from within 
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or outside the organization. Because they cannot escape notice, they react by disclosing 
the environmental information. In some cases, the management itself may be 
disinterested in environmental reporting, resulting in a passive posture; this is labelled 
as “management inattention” (Rogers & Tebben-Lembke, 1999). In contrast, the 
manager of a proactive firm takes the initiative in environmental reporting, rather than 
waiting for pressures to force him to do so. In this study, strategic posture was 
considered as a mediator to explain the reason that corporate governance has a 
significant effect on environmental reporting. 
Several studies have investigated the impact of a strategic posture or orientation 
towards environmental and social issues and practices (Ullmann, 1985; Magness, 2006; 
Galbreath, 2010). Ullmann’s framework indicates a positive relationship between an 
active strategic posture and a high level of environmental reporting. This key article 
has been followed by several empirical studies which examined this relationship 
(Roberts, 1992; Bateman & Crant, 1993; Crant, 2000). The notion of a strategic posture 
in Ullmann’s (1985) framework shows the manner in which companies deal with the 
social demand of stakeholders, including whether managers follow a pro-active 
strategic posture rather than a less-active strategic posture (Crant, 2000).  Bateman and 
Crant (1993) stated that managers adopting a pro-active strategic posture have a 
tendency to create changes in environmental and social issues.  
In the context of environmental behaviour and its relation with active 
managerial postures, several studies assert that for organisations to gain a thorough 
competitive advantage, linkages must be made between management and the natural 
environment (Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997).  Moreover, a number of studies have 
found a positive relationship between a strategic posture and environmental reporting.  
For example, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) found that the influence of stakeholders upon 
a strategic posture has a vital impact on establishing a CSR report. Additionally, 
findings show that an active posture towards social and environmental issues leads to a 
greater level of environmental reporting. In the Malaysian context, a study conducted 
by Elijido-Ten (2004) to investigate the determinants of environmental reporting by 
listed companies found that a strategic posture is considered to be the main determinant 
in the establishment of environmental reporting by Malaysian listed companies. 
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3. Hypotheses Development 
In this study, based on the literature review, five corporate governance factors are 
considered as the determinants of environmental reporting (Figure 1); namely, board 
size (e.g., Abeysekera, 2010; Allegrini & Greco, 2013), board independency (Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Shan, 2009), CSR committee presence (e.g., Michelon & Parbonetti, 2010) 
ownership concentration (e.g., Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Reverte, 2009), and 
institutional ownership (e.g., Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Laidroo, 2009). Furthermore, 
the mediating role of managers’ strategic posture was proposed in this study to provide 








Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
 
3.1 Board Size 
The board of directors has an essential role in corporate governance in that the directors 
are able to task managers to look after the best interests of the shareholders (Beiner et 
al., 2004). The size of the board, in terms of the number of members, is believed to have 
an effect on the board’s ability to monitor and evaluate management. It has been 
contended that with an increase in the number of directors on the board, the likelihood 
of asymmetry of information decreases (Chen & Jaggi, 2000).   Moreover, Akhtaruddin 
et al. (2009) mentioned that uncertainty and lack of information may be limited by the 
presence of a larger number of members on the board. Accordingly, an increase in the 
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number of directors is anticipated to increase the collective knowledge and also the 
experience of the board, leading to a requirement for a higher level of disclosure of 
information (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Furthermore, the board of directors can create 
strategies and policies for managers to adopt (Chen & Jagii, 2000) and the actions of 
corporate governance influence management direction, leading management to adopt 
or to avoid a specific strategy (Baysinger et al., 1991). As such, an increase in the 
number of directors is expected to positively affect managers’ strategic posture towards 
environmental reporting.  
Studies on the impact of board size on environmental and social responsibility 
reporting have reported negative, positive and even no effect. The ones that reported 
negative relationships believed that a large board size will increase communication and 
coordination problems and consequently decrease the ability of the board to control the 
management (Eisenberg et al., 1998). On the other hand, other scholars believe that 
corporate transparency may be promoted where a firm has a large board size, as the 
available resources and pool of expertise is likely to be greater (Hidalgo et al., 2011), 
and given the concept of expert power, there will be greater diversity of experience and 
opinion, which will increase the supervisory capacity of the board and lead to more 
voluntary disclosure (Gandia, 2008). Amran et al. (2011) stated that positive and 
negative aspects of board size neutralize each other’s effect and consequently they 
found no effect. As most of empirical research have illustrated that board size has a 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Abeysekere, 2010; Allegrini & Greco, 
2013), following hypotheses were developed:  
H1. Board size has a significant positive effect on the (a) strategic posture and (b) 
environmental reporting level of firms. 
 
3.2 Board Independency 
The importance of having independent outside directors has been highlighted in the 
literature. First, as they have a non-official position, they can better monitor the 
management (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). Second, having the incentive of being 
expert monitors, they are discouraged from colluding with directors of organization 
(Carter et al., 2003). Outside board members acting as representatives of the 
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shareholders have a strong motivation to monitor management and detect and prevent 
any problems (Abdullah et al., 2008). This is potentially motivated by two factors. 
Firstly, the directors wish to protect their reputations as stakeholders by ensuring that 
monitoring of management is in place, as the market for directors penalises those 
associated with corporate disasters or with poor performance. Secondly, from a legal 
perspective, directors who fail to implement due care in exercising their monitoring 
responsibilities may be liable and also subject to harsh sanctions (Abdullah et al., 2008).  
As such, it is expected that independent board members will have a tendency to give 
more consideration to an active strategy posture. 
Empirical evidence concerning the importance of non-executive directors on 
the board is mixed. Jermias (2007) believed that inside directors are able to motivate 
managers in a better way to implement environmentally active strategies. On the other 
hand, many scholars have found board independency to be a positive driver of both 
mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure behavior (Eng & Mak, 2003; Shan, 
2009). In fact, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Shan (2009) found a positive 
relationship between board independency and voluntary disclosures. Since independent 
directors tend to voluntarily disclose additional information, thus improving 
transparency of corporate boards (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). It is expected, 
therefore, that more independent directors on company boards would ensure companies 
to engage in social responsibility, generally, and environmental responsibility (Brooks 
et al., 2009). The firms which have more independent directors have strong 
environmental performance, as they tend to pressure managers to favor environmental 
activity (De Villiers et al., 2009). On the other hand, inside directors who focus on 
financial performance of organization tend to disclose less and are less concerned about 
environmental issues (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002). Based on the above, therefore, the 
following hypotheses were developed: 
H2. Board independency has a significant positive effect on the (a) strategic posture 
and (b) environmental reporting level of firms. 
 
3.3 CSR Committee Presence 
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It is widely known that the structure of a firm's board will influence the commitment 
and involvement of the directors in shaping the goals and strategies of the firm (e.g., 
Godos-Díez et al., 2018). Both the internal organization and the division of tasks among 
the board's committees are in fact defined by the board structure (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989), and the most important decisions of the board are taken at the committee level 
(Kesner, 1988). A CSR committee is generally responsible for policy and conducts a 
review of the firm's commitment to social responsibility (Post et al., 2002). The 
presence of a CSR committee indicates the board is taking a responsible stand towards 
social and environmental issues and further demonstrates a firm’s active strategic 
posture to improve its corporate behavior to meet stakeholder expectations (Lo & Yap, 
2011; Godos-Díez et al., 2018).  The existence of a CSR committee enables 
stakeholders’ interests to be integrated into decision making (Luoma & Goodstein, 
1999) for two main reasons. Firstly, a CSR committee can assist the firm to formally 
organize and manage its CSR practices (De Villiers et al., 2011), and so CSR becomes 
institutionalized within the firms’ core decision-making (Amran et al., 2014). Secondly, 
according to signalling theory (Connelly et al., 2011), firms can send a signal to their 
stakeholders regarding their CSR commitment (Amran et al., 2014) by creating a sub-
committee related to sustainability issues (Mallin & Michelon, 2011).  
Consistent with the agency theory, more environmentally active strategies are 
expected to be implemented by CSR committees (Peters & Romi, 2012).  From the 
stakeholder perspective, the presence of a CSR committee or a director on the board 
with responsibility for environment-related issues indicates an organisation’s active 
strategic posture with respect to their stakeholders (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).  In 
support of this claim, Ullmann (1985) indicated that at the board level, the existence of 
a director with responsibility for environmental and social issues, or the presence of a 
CSR committee that leads an organisation to adopt an active strategic posture, takes 
into consideration the interests of their stakeholders. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses were developed: 
H3. CSR committee presence has a significant positive effect on the (a) strategic 
posture and (b) environmental reporting level of firms. 
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3.4 Ownership Concentration 
Agency theory claims that agency conflicts result from the separation between control 
and ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This separation is greater when the shares 
are widely held, and is known as ownership dispersion, in comparison to the situation 
when they are closely held, which is known as ownership concentration (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  When interest misalignment and information asymmetry between the 
manager/agent and the owner/principal are present, problems associated with 
managerial opportunism will be greater, causing agency costs to rise (Khlif et al., 2017). 
In order to mitigate such costs and the severity of any conflicts with respect to 
ownership dispersion, managers may elect to increase the level of voluntarily 
disclosures of information. Ownership dispersion also tends to work towards increasing 
pressure on managers to act favorably towards environmental reporting (Ullmann, 
1985; Cullen & Christopher, 2002). Furthermore, managers and directors who own 
corporate stock usually tend to be less eager to over-invest in CSR actions, because 
they have to bear a proportion of the costs as shareholders (Barnea & Rubin, 2010). As 
such, it is expected that ownership dispersion will positively affect managers’ strategic 
posture toward environmental reporting.  
An important factor proposed to have an important impact on disclosure policy 
is ownership concentration, which can be concentrated or dispersed (Ullmann, 1985; 
Roberts, 1992). When ownership is concentrated, shareholders can obtain information 
directly from the firm, thus reducing the motivation of owners to disclose information 
on environmental activities and policies (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008). In contrast, when 
there are many owners, a corporation is expected to disclose more information to 
maintain close links between the organization and its shareholders with respect to 
information (Prencipe, 2004). The empirical evidence reported by scholars showed a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and CSR disclosure level 
(Ghazali, 2007; Qa’dan & Suwaidan, 2019). Accordingly, the following hypotheses 
were developed: 
H4. Ownership concentration has a significant negative effect on the (a) strategic 
posture and (b) environmental reporting level of firms. 
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3.5 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership refers to the percentage of shares held by large and/or 
institutional shareholders. Institutional investors can be seen as a special group of 
shareholders with a relatively larger stake of shares and greater voting power (Qa’dan 
& Suwaidan, 2019; Schnatterly et al., 2008). Most institutional investors are concerned 
with long-term profitability, which can be enhanced by CSR practices (Chung et al., 
2002; Mahoney & Roberts, 2007). As such, institutional investors use their voting 
power and place pressure on managers to disclose more information on environmental 
performance. Lakhal (2005) and Shan (2009) found that institutional ownership has 
negative effect on corporate disclosures. In the firms that ownership and control are 
separated, the demand for information is greater; hence when internal information can 
be accessed easily, such as in the case of large institutional shareholders, the demand 
for more disclosure is less (Lakhal, 2005; Shan, 2009). 
In contrast, a study by Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) found institutional 
ownership as a driver of public disclosure. Institutional investors influence managerial 
decision-making (Mallin et al., 2013) as they have the power to monitor managers’ 
decisions and activities (Graves & Waddock, 1990). Considering public awareness 
about environmental issues and their pressure on companies to take responsibility for 
the impact of their activities, large institutional shareholders have a positive attitude 
towards environmental reporting and, consequently, place pressure on managers to 
have an active strategic posture towards environmental reporting (Welford et al., 2007). 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) argued that institutional investors desire and demand more 
voluntary disclosures. As public awareness and demand for environment-friendly 
activities have increased gradually in the past few years, a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and environmental reporting is expected in this study. 
Furthermore, it is generally viewed that institutional investors are savvy; they are highly 
experienced, with a high level of technical expertise to scrutinise managers in a manner 
which is effective (Lawal, 2012). The empirical studies showed a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and CSR disclosure level (Oh et al., 2011; Khlif et al., 
2017; Qa’dan & Suwaidan, 2019). Thus, the following hypotheses were developed: 
H5. Institutional ownership has a significant positive effect on the (a) strategic posture 
and (b) environmental reporting level of firms. 
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3.6 Strategic Posture 
An organization which adopts an active strategic posture seeks to continuously monitor 
and manage its relationship with the key stakeholders, whereas one which has a passive 
strategic posture makes no such attempt. Therefore, a more environmental disclosure is 
expected in an organization with active strategic posture (Ullmans, 1985) in order to 
fulfill stakeholder needs. Studies which have examined the impact of environmental 
behavior on an active managerial posture found a relationship between management, 
the decision-making process, and decisions towards environmental practices (Hart, 
1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997). 
The existing relationships reveal the positive impact of corporate governance 
on managers’ strategic posture (e.g., Welford et al., 2008; Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012) and public disclosure (e.g., Giannarakis, 2014; Kilic et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, there is extensive literature that examines the association between 
a strategic posture and environmental reporting, which indicates that a strategic posture 
has a vital role in enhancing environmental reporting (Ullmann et al., 1985; Roberts, 
1992; Bateman & Crant, 1993; Crant, 2000). Based on the integrated view of the 
dynamic capabilities and a natural resource-based view in the related literature, Aragon-
Correa and Sharma (2003) formulated a framework which indicated that a pro-active 
strategy, in the context of social and environmental issues, could mediate the 
relationship between organisational resources and capabilities with a comparative 
advantage. Furthermore, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) affirmed that companies which 
disclose more information about social and environmental issues, such as those that 
have a clear pro-active strategy, are backed strongly by the support of their main 
stockholders.  Therefore, corporate governance factors are expected to be the 
scrutinising mechanisms influencing management to follow a specific strategy in order 
to meet stakeholders’ concerns, which, in turn, leads to an enhanced level of 
environmental reporting. Therefore, in this study, indirect effect of corporate 
governance on environmental reporting through strategic posture was proposed. Thus, 
the following hypotheses were developed: 
H6. Strategic posture has a significant positive effect on the environmental reporting 
level of firms. 
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H7. Strategic posture mediates the impact of (a) board size, (b) board independence, (c) 
CSR committee presence, (d) ownership concentration, and (e) institutional ownership 
on environmental reporting level of firms. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Data Collection and Sample 
Data are collected in this study by using the primary and secondary approaches. 
Information concerning environmental performance for one year, from annual reports 
and the associated companies’ websites for the financial year ending in 2015 of the 
main board of Bursa Malaysia, were examined in order to collect environmental 
reporting data. The total number of companies was 777. The environmental reporting 
level of firms was calculated following a reporting checklist outlined by Clarkson et al. 
(2008). This index initially combines both hard reporting items and soft reporting items, 
with a total of 95 points in its reporting checklist (see Appendix). The index was 
evaluated by five academicians to validate that only disclosure items are included. In 
this study, two persons were chosen as coders, and rated five sets of annual reports of 
listed companies (Amran & Devi, 2008). The result of the test of differences showed 
no significant differences between the two coders’ ratings. To collect data related to 
managers’ strategic posture, the questionnaire was sent to the chief executive managers 
or chief financial managers of large firms after a pre-test with five academicians and 
two firm managers. Top management managers were chosen as respondents because 
they are the best-qualified to address the questions asked and have a holistic 
understanding of the company strategies. 
Given the small sampling frame of the study and the likelihood of a low 
response from a mail survey, census sampling was used, and after removing 20 
companies that participated in the pilot study, 757 questionnaires were mailed with 
return envelopes. Subsequently, telephone calls were made to these respondents to 
inform them about the importance of the questionnaire and ask for their cooperation 
and participation in the study. A first reminder was sent after two weeks, and after a 
month, a second one was sent. After two months, the data collection was stopped, at 
which point 208 questionnaires had been returned, of which eleven were incomplete. 
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Hence the usable response rate was 26.0%. In order to compare the characteristics of 
early and late respondents, a non-response bias test was conducted, which indicated 
that non-response bias was not the issue in this study. To test the robustness of the 
collected sample, the statistical power of the sample of 197 was measured as suggested 
by Mayr et al. (2007). G*Power version 3.1.9.2 software (Faul et al., 2007) was used 
to measure the power of the sample. Using G*Power with a statistical significance (α 
level) of 0.05 yielded the power of 0.976, which was well above the rule-of-thumb in 
Chin’s (1998) satisfactory power of 0.800. In other words, the collected sample of 197 
questionnaires was sufficient for the inferential statistics to test the hypotheses (Faul et 
al., 2009). 
A minority of the respondents were below 35 years of age and comprised 7.2 % 
of the sample. Meanwhile, the percentage of 85.8 % is divided almost equally between 
other groups falling in the age category of more than 35 years. With respect to gender, 
the number of males (69.5%) was much higher than females (29.5%). The majority of 
respondents (61.4%) were in top management positions and the rest were middle 
managers (38.6%). Furthermore, the descriptive analysis shows that most of the firms 
(94.4%) had been in the same kind of business for more than 15 years. Most of the 
listed companies (60.4%) have more than 500 employees, while companies (24.9%) 
with between 301-400 employees were next, followed by companies (14.7%) with 
between 201-300 employees. 
 
4.2 Measure of Constructs 
Primary and secondary data were collected in order to measure the study 
variables. To measure environmental reporting (ER) and corporate governance 
mechanisms, the annual reports of companies were used. To measure the level of 
environmental reporting in listed companies’ annual reports, the current paper used 
content analysis by implementing a GRI-based index developed by Clarkson et al. 
(2008) (Appendix 1). The environmental disclosure index is based on the GRI 
framework and consists of seven broad categories (A1 to A7). Clarkson et al. (2008) 
stated that both the level of environmental disclosure and the nature of disclosure (i.e. 
hard or soft) are assessed using the environmental disclosure index. Hard disclosure 
items, which are difficult to replicate, approximate the environmental commitment of 
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companies in an objective and verifiable manner and comprise the following categories: 
(A1) governance structure and management systems relating to environmental 
protection; (A2) credibility of environmental disclosures; (A3) environmental 
performance indicators; and (A4) environmental spending. Soft disclosure items, in 
contrast, are not easily verifiable (and sometimes unverifiable) and can be provided by 
any company (Clarkson et al., 2008). These cover claims regarding vision and strategy 
(A5), environmental profile (A6), and environmental performance (A7). In category 
A3 (Environmental Performance Indicators), the item scores range from 0 to 6. The 
remaining category items are not weighted and the items are scored zero (0) if they are 
absent from the annual report, or one (1) when they are present in the annual report. 
Board size (BS) refers to the number of directors that sit on the board (Khan, 
2010; Rao et al., 2012). The percentage of non-executive directors to total directors is 
the index that was used to measure board independency (BI) (Said et al., 2009; Khan, 
2010). To measure CSR committee (CRRC) presence, a dummy variable of value 1 
indicates the company has a board-level CSR committee, while if the dummy variable 
has a value of 0, then it does not (Adnan, 2010). As suggested by Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) and Ghazali (2007), ownership concentration (OC) was operationalized by 
taking the total number of shares issued and looking at that percentage owned by the 
ten largest stakeholders. By calculating the percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors, the institutional ownership (IO) was calculated (Saleh et al., 2010; Rao et al., 
2012). The strategic posture (SP) was measured using a structured questionnaire. Five 
proposed dimensions of corporate governance were operationalized using indices 
which are suggested in the literature. Strategic posture items were adapted from 
Álvarez-Gil et al. (2007). These items were measured by using a 5-point Likert scale. 
Following the academic research in social and environmental reporting context, 
firm size, age as listed company, profitability, and type of industry were considered as 
control variables in the present study (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006; Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009). According to Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 
and Liu and Anbumozhi (2009), these four factors have significant effects on firms’ 
corporate social disclosure. The firm’s size in this study was measured using the 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy. This measurement has been undertaken in other 
studies related to environmental and social reporting (Gul & Leung, 2004; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006).  Age as listed company 
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is the number of years since the company was listed in the Bursa Malaysia as of the end 
of 2015 (e.g., Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009). Profitability was measured using Return on 
Equity (ROE): net Income/total Equity. This measurement is widely used in studies 
related to social and environmental reporting (Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Barako et al., 2006; Khan et al., 2013). Many studies have divided the sectors 
into two types, namely environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive 
(Amran et al., 2012). Following the related literature in the context of Malaysia (Ahmad 
et al., 2003; Manaf et al., 2006), the current study categorized listed companies into two 
different categories: environmentally sensitive industries including consumer products, 
industrial products, construction, infrastructure project companies, properties, 
plantation and mining, which are given a score of one, and non-environmentally 
sensitive industries including technology, trading and services, and hotels, which are 
given a score of zero. 
 
4.3 Analysis 
In this study, the data were analyzed using partial least squares (PLS) technique due to 
exploratory nature of the study (Hair et al., 2011). The PLS was run in SmartPLS 
version 3.0 and the results are presented in the next section. To determine the validity 
and reliability of the variables, in the first step, the measurement model was assessed 
(Iranmanesh et al., 2017; Ali et al., 2019; Zailani et al., 2019). Later, the hypotheses 
were tested in the second step. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Measurement Model Results 
Factor loading, average variance extracted (AVE), and composite reliability (CR) were 
utilized to examine the convergent validity (Hair et al., 2014). The factor loadings were 
above 0.7, the values of AVE above 0.5, and the CR and cronbach’s alpha of strategic 
posture was higher than 0.7, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, the convergent validity of 
the findings was satisfactory (Hair et al., 2014). 
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Table 1. Results of Measurement Model 







Normally my firm begins the action and the 
competitor responds to it. 
0.868 0.946 0.860 0.777 










In my firm, the managers actively look for the 
satisfaction of the stakeholders (customer, suppliers, 




In my firm, the managers actively look for new ideas. 0.926    
CR= Composite Reliability; AVE= Average Variance Extracted 
 
Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) approach was used to assess the discriminant 
validity. The square root of AVE for each construct of the study exceeded the 
intercorrelations between the construct and other constructs in the model (Table 2), thus 
confirming the discriminant validity of all the constructs. 
Table 2. Discriminant Validity 
  ER BS BI CSRC OC IO SP 
ER One Item       
BS 0.445 One Item      
BI 0.2343 -0.093 One Item     
CSRC 0.542 0.199 0.168 One Item    
OC -0.003 -0.034 0.091 0.021 One Item   
IO 0.367 0.303 0.186 0.276 0.358 One Item  
SP 0.641 0.345 0.343 0.575 -0.024 0.343 0.881 
ER: Environmental Reporting, BS: Board Size, BI: Board Independency, CSRC: CSR Committee 
Presence, OC: Ownership Concentration, IO: Institutional Ownership, SP: Strategic Posture 
5.2 Structural Model Results 
Explained variance portion determined the accuracy of the model’s predictions, where 
the R2 values of strategic posture were 0.480 and of environmental reporting were 
0.539. To test the hypotheses, non-parametric bootstrapping was applied (Table 3) 
(Wetzels et al., 2009).  The results indicated that BS (β = 0.239, p<0.001), BI (β = 
0.273, p<0.001), CSRC (β = 0.448, p<0.001), and IO (β = 0.131, p<0.05), have positive 
significant effects on SP. The impact of OC on SP is not significant ((β = -0.097, 
p>0.05). Thus, H1a, H2a, H3a, and H5a were supported, whereas H4a was not 
supported. Furthermore, BS (β = 0.245, p<0.001), CSRC (β = 0.238, p<0.001), and SP 
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(β = 0.331, p<0.001) have a significant direct effect on the ER level of firms. The direct 
impact of BI (β = 0.078, p>0.05), OC (β = -0.032, p>0.05), and IO (β = 0.092, p>0.05) 
on the ER level of firms was not supported. As such, H1b, H3b, and H6 were supported, 
whereas H2b, H4b, and H5b were not supported. The control variables have no 
significant effect on environmental reporting. 
Table 3. Path Coefficients and Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses  Relationships Path Coefficients Decisions 
Strategic Posture (R2 = 480, Q2 = 0.311) 
H1a BS -> SP 0.239*** Supported 
H2a BI  -> SP 0.273*** Supported 
H3a CSRC -> SP 0.448*** Supported 
H4a OC  -> SP -0.097 Not supported 
H5a IO -> SP 0.131* Supported 
Environmental Reporting (R2 = 539, Q2 = 0.356)  
H1b BS -> ER 0.245*** Supported 
H2b BI  -> ER 0.078 Not supported 
H3b CSRC -> ER 0.238*** Supported 
H4b OC  -> ER -0.032 Not supported 
H5b IO  -> ER 0.092 Not supported 
H6 SP -> ER 0.330*** Supported 
- Size -> ER 0.031 - 
- Age as listed company-> ER 0.027 - 
- Profitability -> ER 0.026 - 
- Sector -> ER -0.084 - 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Q2: cross-validated redundancy 
 
 
According to Hair et al. (2011), there is a significant mediating effect when 
there is no zero straddling the Upper Level and Lower Level values of the constructs’ 
relationships within the confidence interval. This means that a significant mediating 
effect is indicated when the Upper Level and Lower Level values show no zero straddle 
between them. Accordingly, Preacher and Hayes (2008, 2004) advocated the 
bootstrapping method in order to test the indirect effect of the constructs which this 
study applied. Based on the results in Table 4, only the indirect effect of OC on the ER 
lower level (LL) was negative and upper level (UP) was positive and consequently has 




Table 4. Indirect Effect 
Hypotheses  Relationships Indirect Effect LL UL Decision 
H7a BS -> SP -> ER 0.079** 0.019 0.132 Supported 
H7b BI  -> SP -> ER 0.090** 0.043 0.190 Supported 
H7c CSRC -> SP -> ER 0.148** 0.019 0.132 Supported  
H7d OC -> SP -> ER -0.032 -0.056 0.041 Not Supported 
H7e IO  -> SP -> ER 0.043* 0.005 0.129 Supported 
 
6. Discussion 
The positive effect of board size on environmental reporting is consistent with the 
findings of Abeysekera (2010) and Allegrini and Greco (2013). The results also showed 
board size has an indirect effect on environmental reporting through managers’ 
strategic posture. As such, this study extends the findings of Abeysekera (2010) and 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) by introducing managers’ strategic posture as one of the 
potential explanations for the impact of board size on the environmental reporting level 
of firms. This means that a large board size has diverse experiences and consequently, 
its members understand the importance of environmental reporting in the present 
competitive market. As such, there is higher pressure on managers to produce as well 
as disclose environmental reports. This finding highlights the importance of having 
large board size for the shareholders that give importance to public disclosure of a 
firm’s activities which have environmental outcomes. However, the existence of a 
direct effect between board size and environmental reporting indicates that there are 
other potential factors that may also explain this relationship and, therefore, further 
studies are needed.  
The direct impact of board independency on environmental reporting was not 
supported. However, the results indicate that board independency has an indirect effect 
on environmental reporting through strategic posture. As such, these results are 
consistent with the findings of Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) and Shan (2009), who 
tested the total impact of board independency on environmental reporting. These results 
indicate that outside directors monitor and have a greater effect on managers’ strategic 
stance towards environmental reporting, and this, consequently, leads to a higher level 
of environmental reporting. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) stated that outside directors 
who have a non-official position in the firms are better able to monitor managers’ 
activities in order to a build reputation as expert monitors. As such, firms should 
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increase the percentage of independent directors due to their role in the managers’ 
stance towards environmental reporting. 
This study also confirms the direct and indirect impacts of CSR committee 
presence on environmental reporting of firms. The managers of the firms that have a 
CSR committee have the authority to oversee management policies and approaches 
towards environmental reporting. The existence of a CSR committee also shows the 
importance of environment-related issues for the board. Thus, the existence of a CSR 
committee will affect the attitude of managers toward environmental reporting, which 
will, in turn, lead to a higher level of environmental reporting. Therefore, forming a 
CSR committee on the board is beneficial to the firm, since it indicates the importance 
of environment-related issues to the top managers and provides a base to integrate CSR 
to the overall management of operations. 
The direct and indirect impacts of ownership concentration on environmental 
reporting were rejected, which implies that there is no relationship between these two 
concepts. These results are not consistent with the findings of Cullen and Christopher 
(2002) and Brammer and Pavelin (2008). It is worthwhile to highlight that ownership 
concentration also has no effect on managers’ stance towards environmental reporting. 
These findings do not mean that large investors have no impact on managers and 
environmental reporting. They do suggest that both large and small investors persuade 
managers to disclose information on firms’ environmental activities. The reason is that 
consumer awareness on environmental issues has been dramatically increased in recent 
years and poor environmental performance has become a major threat to a firm’s 
survival. As such, even those large investors who can obtain information directly from 
a firm are likely to put pressure on managers to disclose more information on 
environmental performance.  In summary, small shareholders put pressure on managers 
due to their lack of access to internal information of firms, but large shareholders put 
pressure due to the perceived risk of low-level environmental reporting. 
The results indicate that institutional ownership has no direct effect on 
environmental reporting. However, the impact of institutional ownership on strategic 
posture was supported and institutional ownership has an indirect effect on 
environmental reporting through strategic posture. In other studies, Habib and Jiang 
(2009) and Shan (2009) found a negative relationship between these institutional 
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ownership and environmental reporting. However, the results of the present study 
extend the findings of Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) by proposing strategic posture as 
a potential reason that brings about a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and environmental reporting. As large institutional shareholders better 
understand the demands for environmental practice from consumers and its impact on 
the financial performance of companies in comparison to small shareholders, they push 
managers to report on environmental practice publicly (Mallin et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, it is also important to consider the power that large institutions have in 
comparison to small investors to influence managers’ decisions. Hence, by increasing 
the percentage of shares held by institutional stakeholders, firms can influence the 
managers’ stance towards environmental reporting. 
The insignificance of the control variables seems to indicate that companies’ 
size, age as listed company, profitability, and the type of industry have no effect on 
environmental reporting. It means that environmental reporting is important for the 
success of companies regardless of their size and the industry that they work in. This 




In this study, the direct impact of corporate governance characteristics on strategic 
posture and environmental reporting was investigated. Furthermore, the indirect effect 
of corporate governance characteristics on environmental reporting through strategic 
posture was investigated as the main objective of the study. The results show that 
managers’ strategic posture mediates the impacts of board size, board independency, 
CSR committee presence, and institutional ownership on environmental reporting. In 
addition, board size and CSR committee presence also have a direct impact on the 
environmental reporting level of firms. Both direct and indirect impacts of ownership 
concentration on environmental reporting were rejected. 
From a theoretical perspective, this study contributes to the literature by testing 
the mediating effect of managers’ strategic posture. The results show that strategic 
posture mediates the impact of board size, board independency, CSR committee, and 
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institutional ownership on environmental reporting. These findings extend the previous 
literature, which only tests the direct effects of corporate governance characteristics on 
environmental reporting. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, this study is one 
of the first to test the importance of corporate governance characteristics on the level 
of environmental reporting in developing countries. This study also explains some of 
the conflicts found in previous studies. However, future studies are needed to test the 
moderating effect of managers' perceptions on consumers' awareness and the demand 
for environmental practices to confirm the provided justification. 
From the managerial perspective, the results of this study will help managers of 
companies to understand those corporate governance aspects that are essential to 
enhance their environmental disclosure. The findings also have implications for policy-
makers to develop environmental disclosure regulations that focus on companies that 
have a small board size, lack of board independency, no CSR committee, and lack of 
large institutional shareholders, which are least likely to disclose adequately the impact 
of their business operations on the environment. The study also has implications for 
other countries in the Asian region, where power tends to be concentrated within the 
main shareholders of firms who tend to avoid selecting board members from outside. 
The results help highlight to them the importance of board independency on the 
environmental reporting level of firms. 
The aim of the present study is considered to have been successfully achieved. 
Nevertheless, the limitations should be raised, which can be addressed in future studies. 
First, although the relationship between corporate governance and environmental 
reporting was successfully mediated by managers’ strategic posture, the direct impact 
of board size and CSR committee presence on environmental reporting suggests that 
there are some other potential mediators which may fully explain the impact of 
corporate governance characteristics on the environmental reporting level of firms. 
Therefore, future research could investigate other potential mediators. Second, the 
findings of some previous studies showed areas of conflict. For example, although most 
studies showed a negative relationship between institutional ownership and 
environmental reporting (Lakhal, 2005; Habib & Jiang, 2009; Shan, 2009), the findings 
of this study and Donnelly and Mulcahy’s (2008) study found a positive relationship 
between these factors. The conflict in the results may be due to other factors, which 
may be due to the different samples of these studies which could moderate the impacts 
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of corporate governance characteristics on environmental reporting. Therefore, future 
studies should explore and test the impact of potential moderators. Third, in addition to 
the five corporate governance factors considered in this study, there are some other 
corporate governance factors, such as CEO duality (Roberts et al., 2005; Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006), the presence of women on the board (Rao et al., 2012; Rupley et al., 
2012), the presence of family on the board (Ho & Wong, 2001; Darmadi & Sodikin, 
2013), and director ownership (Ghazali, 2007; Haji, 2013), that may affect 
environmental reporting, and future studies could add them to the variables used in this 
study. Furthermore, leverage, media exposure (Reverte, 2009), and risk (Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003) can also be considered as control variables in future studies. Finally, 
the environmental reporting level of firms was measured using a checklist developed 
by Clarkson et al. (2008), which is constructed based on the GRI G2 Standards (2002). 
Future studies could measure environmental reporting level using Mahmood et al.’s 
(2018) checklist, which was developed based on the GRI G4 as an updated GRI 
standard. Finally, age as listed company was considered in this study, as in Malaysia 
annual report disclosure is only mandatory for listed companies in Bursa Malaysia; and 
consequently the inculturation toward disclosure begins when they are listed in Bursa 
Malaysia. Moreover, the future studies can also test the impact of age of firm. 
Appendix 1. Index Assessing the Reporting about Environmental Policies, 
Performance and Inputs  
N Disclosure Items Score 
 Hard disclosure items  
(A1) Governance structure and management systems 
(maximum score is 6 with each item evenly weighted) 
1 Existence of a department for pollution control and/or management 
positions for environment. management  
(0–1) 
2 Existence of an environmental and/or a public issues committee on 
the Board  
(0–1) 
3 Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or 
customers regarding environmental practices  
(0–1) 
4 Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies  (0–1) 
5 Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant/factory and/or firm level  (0–1)   
6 Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance  (0–1) 
(A2) Credibility (max score is 10 with each item weighted evenly) 
1 Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a 
CERES report  
(0–1) 
2 Independent verification/assurance about environmental information 
disclosed in the EP report/web  
(0–1) 
3 Periodic independent verifications/audits on environmental 
performance and/or systems  
(0–1) 
4 Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies  (0–1) 
5 Product certification with respect to environmental impact  (0–1) 
6 External environmental performance awards and/or inclusion in a 
sustainability index  
(0–1) 
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7 Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure processes  (0–1) 
8 Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by EPA 
or the Department of Energy  
(0–1) 
9 Participation in industry-specific associations/initiatives to improve 
environmental practices  
(0–1) 
10 Participation in other environmental organisations/associations to 
improve environmental practices (if not awarded under 8 or over 9)  
 
(0–1) 
Appendix 1. Index Assessing the Reporting about Environmental Policies, 
Performance and Inputs (Continue) 
N Disclosure Items Score 
(A3) Environmental performance indicators (EPI) 
(max score is 60 with each item weighted from 0-6) 
1 EPI on energy use and/or energy efficiency  (0–6) 
2 EPI on water use and/or water use efficiency  (0–6) 
3 EPI on greenhouse gas emissions  (0–6) 
4 EPI on other air emissions  (0–6) 
5 EPI on TRI (land, water, air)  (0–6) 
6 EPI on other discharges, releases and/or spills (not TRI)  (0–6) 
7 EPI on waste generation and/or management (recycling, re-use, 
reducing, treatment and disposal)  
(0–6) 
8 EPI on land and resources use, biodiversity and conservation  (0–6) 
9 EPI on environmental impacts of products and services  (0–6) 
10 EPI on compliance performance (e.g., exceedances, reportable 
incidents)  
(0–6) 
(A4) Environmental spending (max score is 3 with each item weighted evenly) 
1 Summary of dollar savings arising from environmental initiatives to 
the company  
(0–1) 
2 Amount spent on technologies, R& D and/or innovations to enhance 
environmental performance and/or efficiency  
(0–1) 
3 Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues  (0–1) 
Soft disclosure items  
(A5) Vision and strategy claims (max score is 6 with each item evenly weighted) 
1 CEO statement on environmental performance in letter form to 
shareholders and/or stakeholders  
(0–1) 
2 A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and principles, 
environmental codes of conduct  
(0–1) 
3 A statement about formal management systems regarding 
environmental risk and performance  
(0–1) 
4 A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations 
of its environmental performance  
(0–1) 
5 A statement of measurable goals in terms of future environmental 
performance (if not awarded under A3)  
(0–1) 
6 A statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new 
technologies  
(0–1) 
(A6) Environmental profile (max score is 4 with each item evenly weighted) 
1 A statement about the firm’s compliance (or lack thereof) with 
specific environmental standards  
(0–1) 
2 An overview of the environmental impact of the industry  (0–1) 
3 An overview of how the business operations and/or products and 
services impact the environment 
(0–1) 
4 An overview of corporate environmental performance relative to 
industry peers  
(0–1) 
(A7) Environmental initiatives (max score is 6 with each item evenly weighted) 
1 A substantive description of employee training in environmental 
management and operations  
(0–1) 
2 Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents  (0–1) 
3 Internal environmental awards  (0–1) 
4 Internal environmental audits  (0–1) 
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5 Internal certification of environmental programs  (0–1) 
6 Community involvement and/or donations related to the environment 
(if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7)  
(0–1) 
Source: Clarkson et al. (2008) 
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